On The Development of One’s Talents, by Phin Upham
by Phin Upham
Kant’s third example explores the implications of wanting to live for pleasure over betterment as a duty. The scenario is as follows: A young man wishes to live for pleasure only but has a great talent which could be developed into something which would help society and make him useful as a member of society. The question is whether following your desires for indulgence in this instance is a duty. Kant analyzes this on two levels. First, can this maxim be universalized without inherent contradictions? Kant claims that it can be for historical reasons, and points out the South Sea Islanders as an example (one instance is enough to show that something is possible). The second stage of his analysis is whether willing the universalization of something leads to a contradiction between what you will for others and what you will for yourself. Kant claims that this example fails under this criteria since “as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him, and have been given to him, for all sorts of possible purposes” (193). So although it is no contradiction for him to will this duty on others he cannot rationally will it upon himself.
This last stage of the argument seems to be at least partially an assertion. Is it really true that as a rational being one necessarily wills the development of ones abilities? Let us suppose that ones special talent lies in the art of assassination, theft, or murder. This is what one would be best at (thus they offer the most room for developing). Granted these examples possibly contradict the initial premise that he will be a “useful man.” But are not thieves, although harmful in many ways, useful in helping to keep a society wary, and prevent them from becoming overly comfortable and soft? At any rate, if one had a propensity towards thievery, surely one would not, indeed could not, morally will oneself to develop this skill. Surely one cannot praise Shakespeare’s Iago for willing to fulfill his natural ability for motiveless malice (a trait many of us surely lack). Even aside from such hyperbolic counterexamples, why should a man want to maximize his abilities? If he does not desire the ends they would achieve for him, how can the means be implicitly good? If a brilliant lawyer hates practicing law but loves to fix potholes (a task she is particularly bad at), wouldn’t she be justified in becoming a pot hole fixer? Her intentions are good, she desires to achieve happiness (she strongly believes that a better infrastructure is crucial and is happy through fulfilling this belief). Surely Kant cannot prove that a rational being wishes to maximize his/her potential a priori, and no deeper lever of justification is given for this assertion.
But I nevertheless find myself agreeing with Kant.
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About the Author
Phin Upham is an investor who lives in NYC and San Francisco. He has studied at Harvard University and Wharton Business School (UPenn) and is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
